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ABSTRACT: The EU has a Treaty-based obligation to promote democracy in the wider world, with a 
particular emphasis on neighbouring States. Doctrinal approaches to EU democracy promotion 
generally focus on a specific set of instruments, whereas the law of external relations underpins a 
much wider set of policies and practices relating to democracy promotion. This Article applies four 
categories of democracy promotion (on a positive/negative and express/implied axis) to a case 
study of the EU-Turkey relationship. The wider scope provided by this categorisation demonstrates 
that democracy SURPRWLRQ VKRXOG QRW RQO\ EH VHHQ ZLWKLQ WKH FRQILQHV RI ȊSRVLWLYHȋ PHDVXUHV
such as enlargement conditionality but also by measures and practices which are often hidden 
from view. In doing so, a richHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKRZWKHODZRIWKH(8ȇVH[WHUQDOUHOations informs 
policy and practice can be gained. 
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and hence obliges it to uphold and promote democracy across the globe.1 As such, we 
find an expression in the Treaty of the oft-cited characterization of the Union and its 
LGHQWLW\DVDȊQRUPaWLYHSRZHUȋ2 
This Article focuses on how the legal obligation translates into the practices of EU 
democracy promotion. Since a doctrinal legal analysis of democracy promotion would 
likely only capture a select number of measures identifiable as serving this aim, casting 
a wider net enables legal scholarship to appreciate the diversity of instances where de-
mocracy promotion plays a role in EU external relations. The notion of democracy pro-
motion here is therefore wider than that associated with ȊDFWLYLWLHVȋ ZKLFK KDV Ln-
formed much recent research.3 Whilst a rich body of work in political sci-
ence/international relations scholarship has explored democracy promotion, particu-
larly since the emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the TEU 
in 1992, there is a need for legal scholarship to account for this phenomenon too. This 
is for three reasons. First, beFDXVHWKHQDWXUHRIȊGHPRFUDF\ȋSURPRWHGE\WKH(8HYHQ
accounting for its vague parameters) is intrinsically rule-based: the rule of law and hu-
man rights protection are inWHJUDOFRPSRQHQWVRIWKHYDOXHVRIȊGHPRFUDF\ȋ4 Second, 
WKDWWKHLQVWUXPHQWVDQGFRQGXFWRIWKH(8ȇVH[WHUQDOUHODWLRQVDUHXQGHUSLQQHGE\Oe-
gal dynamics, whether these be contractual relations with third States (including 
enlargement, trade or development) or the use of legal instruments as threats (such as 
restrictive measures (sanctions)). Third, understanding how the legal obligation of the 
EU is pursued, even in ways which are indirect or hidden within other aims, allows us to 
more fully appreciate the extent to which the EU can be characterized as a global (legal) 
actor and promoter of democracy. 
The contribution thus is to demonstrate how the wide variety of policies and prac-
tices within the context of a bilateral relationship with a third State and legal space pro-
vide a fuller understanding of democracy promotion by the EU and its claim to norma-
 
1 Arts 2 and 3, para. 5, TEU. 
2 See I. MANNERS, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, in Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 2002, p. 235 et seq,; I. MANNERS, The Normative Power of the European Union in a Globalized 
World, in Z. LAÏDI, EU Foreign Policy in a Globalised World, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008, p. 23 et seq.; R.A. 
DEL SARTO, Normative Empire Europe: the European Union, its Borderlands, and the Arab Spring, in 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2016, p. 216. 
3 See, for example, A. WETZEL, J. ORBIE, F. BOSSUYT, One of What Kind? Comparative Perspectives on 
the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2015, p. 21 et 
seq. 
4  ?WLVQRWDOZD\VSRVVLEOHWRGLVWLQJXLVKȊGHPRFUDF\ȋDQGȊKXPDQULJKWVȋLQ(8GLVFRXUVHZKLFKDUH
often groXSHG WRJHWKHU DV ȊSROLWLFDO UHIRUPVȋ $V VXch, although the focus of this Article is democracy 
promotion, this includes consideration of both human rights and the rule of law as a constituent element. 
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tivity. A four-part categorization is used, exploring positive and negative, express and 
implied instances of democracy promotion.5 
The case study used to demonstrate the different types of democracy promotion at 
play is the EU-Turkey relationship. The EU-Turkey relationship is one which does not 
HDVLO\LQDVLQJOHIUDPHWKH(8ȇVOHJDOHFonomic and political ties with Turkey sit along-
side tensions around migration, security and democratization. The period since 2005 
forms the basis of the study, as this marked the point when EU enlargement negotia-
tions with Turkey were officially opened. But although significant, the EU-Turkey rela-
WLRQVKLSLVQRWPHUHO\RQHEDVHGRQHQODUJHPHQWJLYHQ7XUNH\ȇVȊG\QDPLFHFRQRP\LWV
strategic location and its imSRUWDQWUHJLRQDOUROHȋ6 which distinguishes it from all other 
(recent) candidate States.  
Contemporary relations have been partly structured by the impact of the EU-Turkey 
miJUDWLRQ FRRSHUDWLRQ ȊVWDWHPHQWȋ  EXW DOVR KHLJKWHQHG WHQVLRQV IROORZLQJ WKH
attempted FRXS Gȇ«WDW in Turkey in July 2016. The EU institutions condemned the at-
tempted coup but have expressed concern at the subsequent government crackdown 
on civil society and national institutions.7 Nevertheless, despite the turbulence, the 
depth of the bilateral economic, political and cultural relationship means that there is 
an opportunity to explore a wide variety of democracy promotion efforts. The place of 
democracy promotion and whether the EU is ready to compromise on enforcing its 
stated values is especially pertinent in light of the strategic role played by Turkey in 
(XURSHȇVPLJUDWLRQ control and security agendas. 
The Article does not suggest which of the democracy promotion categories might 
KDYH WKH PRVW GHPRFUDWLVLQJ HIIHFW RQ 7XUNH\ QRU ZKHWKHU WKH ȊGHPRFUDF\ȋ EHLQJ
promoted is example of a changing (neo-)liberal focus within Europe.8 Rather, it dem-
onstrates that democracy promotion should not be seen within the confines of the 
ȊSRVLWLYHȋ PHDVXUHV VXFK HQODUJHPHQW SURFHVV FRQGLWLRQDOLW\ RU VSHFLILF IXQGLQJ Ln-
struments. In putting forward a better understanding of democracy promotion via a 
wider scope of analysis and drawing on insights from political science literature, the Ar-
ticle concludeV WKDW WKH(8ȇVFODLPWREHDQRUPDWLYHSRZHUPD\VWLOOKROGHYHQ LI WKH
values associated with democracy promotion efforts may be sidelined in favour of other 
goals, such as migration control and security. The legal dynamics that underpin EU de-
 
5 As developed in P.J. CARDWELL, Mapping Out Democracy 3URPRWLRQLQWKH(8ȇV([WHUQDO5HODWLRQV, in 
European Foreign Affairs Review, 2011, p. 21 et seq. 
6 Communication COM(2012) 600 final of 10 October 2012 from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2012-2013, p. 16. 
7 Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2016) 366 final of 9 November 2016, Turkey 2016 
Report Ȃ Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy COM(2016) 715 final, www.ec.europa.eu. 
8 A. WETZEL, J. ORBIE (eds), The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005. 
4 Paul James Cardwell 
mocracy promotion nevertheless help us to better understand both the richness of EU 
external relations law and policy, their operationalization and relationship with democ-
ratic values. 
The TreatyTEU VWDWHV WKDW WKH(8LVȊIRXQGHGRQWKHYDOXHVRIUHVSHFWIRUKXPDQGLg-
nity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for huPDQULJKWVȋ9 This 
WUDQVODWHV WR D FRPPLWPHQW WR ȊXSKROG DQG SURPRWH LWV YDOXHVȋ LQ UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKH
wider world.10 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced Art. 21, para. 1, TEU, which stipulates 
WKDWWKH(8ȇVLQWHUQDWLRnal action, Ȋshall be guided by the principles which have inspired 
its own creation, development and HQODUJHPHQWȋ7KHVHSULQFLSOHV LQFOXGHGHPRFUDF\
WKHUXOHRIODZDQGKXPDQULJKWV7KH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHKDVLQWKH(8ȇVLQWHUQDOOHJDORr-
der, ensured that these principles are a distinctive part of general EU law.11 The values 
in the Treaty TEU are no longer specified as those which are common to the Member 
States, but rather to the EU itself as an autonomous actor.12 Legal scholarship has ex-
plored what these values constitute in practical expressions of EU external relations 
and the institutions responsible for their promotion.13  
The TreatyTEU FDOOVIRUVSHFLILFDFWLRQVDWWKH(8OHYHOWRȊVDIHJXDUGLWVYDOXHVȋ14 to 
ȊFRQVROLGDWHDQGVXSSRUWGHPRFUDF\ȋ15 DQGWRȊSURPRWHDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHPEDVHG
on VWURQJHUPXOWLODWHUDOFRRSHUDWLRQDQGJRRGJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHȋ16 This provision lays 
a foundation for the export of EU norms and, with Art. 3, para. 5, TEU, a legal basis.17 
The Treaty makes special mention of the relationship with neighbouring countries and 
OLQNV ZLWK WKH (8ȇV YDOXHV UDWKHU WKDQ shared values with the neighbours). In this re-
VSHFWWKH(8LVFKDUJHGZLWKHVWDEOLVKLQJȊDQDUHDRISURVSHULW\DQGJRRGQHLJKERXUOi-
 
9 Art. 2 TEU. 
10 Art. 3, para. 5, TEU. 
11 B. DE WITTE, The EU and the International Legal Order: the Case of Human Rights, in M. EVANS, P. 
KOUTRAKOS, Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections Between the EU and the Rest of 
the World, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, p. 127 et seq.  
12 P. KOUTRAKOS, EU International Relations Law, 2015, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 419. 
13 See, inter alia, A. MAGEN, The Rule of Law and its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, in 
Stanford Journal of International Law, 2009, p. 51 et seq.; M. CREMONA, Values in EU Foreign Policy, in M. 
EVANS, P. KOUTRAKOS, Beyond the Established Legal Orders, cit., p. 275 et seq., L. PECH, Rule of Law as a 
Guiding PriQFLSOHRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQȇVExternal Action, CLEER Working Papers,  no. 3, 2012/3. 
14 Art. 21, para. 2, let. a), TEU. 
15 Art. 21, para. 2, let. b), TEU. 
16 Art. 21, para. 2, let. h), TEU. 
17 C. HILLION, Anatomy of EU Norm Export Towards the Neighbourhood, in P. VAN ELSUWEGE, R. PETROV, 
Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European 
Union, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, p. 15 et seq. 
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QHVVIRXQGHGRQWKHYDOXHVRIWKH8QLRQȋ18 7KH(8ȇV*OREDO6WUDWHJ\DQGRWKHUUHFent 
foreign policy documents place greDWHPSKDVLVRQȊUHVLOLHQFHȋRI6tates and societies, 
particularly those in the EU neighbourhood, and make an explicit link between the 
promotion of democracy in third countries and maintaining democracy within the EU.19 
7KHUH LV WKXVDFOHDU LIJHQHUDOPDQGDWH WRSURPRWHGHPRFUDF\EH\RQG WKH(8ȇV
ERUGHUV Ȋ'HPRFUDF\ȋ LV QRW GHILQHG LQ WKH 7UHDWLHV ZKLFK LV SHUKDSV QRW VXUSULVLQJ
VLQFHWKHGHPRFUDWLFQDWXUHRIWKH(8LWVHOILVFRQWHVWHGLQVRIDUDVLWLVȊQRWDERXWRYHr-
coming its democratic nation states, but about managing democratic interdepend-
HQFHȋ20 Ongoing deEDWHVZLWKLQWKH(8DERXWKRZWRWDFNOHGHPRFUDWLFȊEDFNVOLGLQJȋLQ
Hungary and Poland reveal the thorny nature of where the limits of democracy lie, and 
what to do about it. When transplanted to the external sphere, the challenges of the EU 
as a non-State polity promoting democracy in a third State is no less difficult. As such, 
.XUNLKDVFKDUDFWHULVHGWKH(8ȇVGHPRFUDF\SURPRWLRQDVEDVHGRQDȊIX]]\ȋIUDPHZRUN 
when compared to the logics followed by the US, but also by other international or non-
governmental organisations.21  
7KH7UHDW\RI/LVERQLQWURGXFHGDVHFWLRQHQWLWOHGȊ3URYLVLRQVRQ'HPRFUDWLF3ULQFi-
SOHVȋ7KHVHIRXUDUWLFOHVDUHQRWFRQFHUQHGZLWKH[WHUnal democracy promotion per se. 
However, they give some insight into the values of democratic legitimacy signalled by 
Art. 21, para. 1, TEU. The provisions focus on Parliamentary accountability and repre-
VHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\DVWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIWKH(8ȇVIXQctioning.22 This reminds us (and 
recalls the argument by Manners)23 that what the EU is affects what it does externally as 
a normative actor. 
8QOLNHLQWKHDFDGHPLFOLWHUDWXUHZLWKLQRIILFLDO(8GLVFRXUVHȊGHPRFUDF\VXSSRUWȋ
LVJHQHUDOO\SUHIHUUHGWRȊGHPRFUDF\SURPRWLRQȋ7KHXVHRIWKHIRUPHUWHUPJLYHVOHVV
of an impression of a one-size-fits-all approach and recognition that the category of 
States where democracy is a subject of concern or discussion is very wide. As a conse-
quence, as Pace has argued in the Mediterranean context,24 this means that EU policy-
 
18 Art. 8, para. 1, TEU. For further exploratLRQ RI WKH QDWXUH RI ȊJRRG QHLJKERXUOLQHVVȋ VHH WKH
contributions to: D. KOCHENOV, E. BASHESKA (eds), Good Neighbourliness in the European Legal Context, 
Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015. 
19 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: A Global Strategy for the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQȇV)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\6KDUHG9LVLRQ&RPPRQ$FWLRQ$6WURQJHU(XURSH, 28 June 
2016, www.europa.eu; From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 
1, 7 June 2017, www.europa.eu. 
20 J. NEYER, Justice and the Right to Justification: Conceptual Reflections, in D. KOCHENOV, G. DE BÚRCA, 
A. WILLIAMS (eds), (XURSHȇV-XVWLFH'HILFLW", Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015, p. 211 et seq. 
21 M. KURKI, Fuzzy Liberalism and EU Democracy Promotion: Why Concepts Matter, in A. WETZEL, J. 
ORBIE (eds), The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005, p. 35 et seq. 
22 Art. 10, para. 1, TEU 
23 I. MANNERS, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, cit. 
24 M. PACE, Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean, in 
Democratization, 2009, p. 39 et seq. 
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making suffers from incoherence in terms of objectives. In official documentation, fre-
TXHQWUHIHUHQFHVDUHPDGHWRHPSKDVLVLQJȊFRPPRQȋDQGȊVKDUHGȋYDOues between the 
EU and a third State, even in instances where the two would appear to have little in 
common in terms of democratic governance. Frequent reference is made to instru-
ments of international law (especially if signed by the third State), or a pre-existing legal 
framework with the EU (such as the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and 
Pacific States) or within the SWDWHȇV RZQ UHJLRQ DV D PHDQV RI VLJQLI\LQJ ZKDW YDlues 
these might be. At the same time, this vagueness represents a recognition of a differen-
tiation of values in a process of dialogue where the EU is considering deeper coopera-
tion with a third SWDWH%XWWKHQDWXUHRIZKDWYDOXHVDUHȊVKDUHGȋFDQEHYDULHGDccord-
LQJWRWKH(8ȇVRZQLQWHUHVWV$V/HLQRKDVREVHUYHG25 WKHȊXQLYHUVDOȋODQJXDJHFDQEH
used to promote its own objectives and therefore is not something genuinely shared, 
EXWDȊIDOVHXQLYHUVDOȋ 
The common or shared values are thus difficult to identify in their entirety with any 
certainty, even if aspects of democracy can be crystallised into a core sub-set of values 
(as Pech has argued in the case of the rule of law).26 Taken as a whole, the difficulties 
reflect the even more fundamental question of what type of democracy the EU itself 
embodies beyond the general principles of law identified by the Court of Justice in the 
absence of a definition in the Treaty. Needless to say, the under-determination of objec-
tives has an impact on democracy promotion efforts.27 The risk with a differentiated 
DSSURDFKLVWKDWWKH(8ȇVUHLWHUDWLRQRILWVVWURQJFRPPLWPHQWWRSURPRWLQJ democracy 
includes an in-built downgrading of democracy when other interests are at stake. 
Common/shared values can be stressed if the aim is to demonstrate that cooperation, 
rather than criticism, is sought with the third State(s) in question. The way in which the 
obligation to promote democracy and democratic values in the wider world is thus un-
even, and perhaps unavoidably so. 
$VWKH(8ȇV*OREDO6WUDWHJ\QRWHV28 ensuring security, economic prosperity and sta-
bility in the Mediterranean has clear and tangible benefits for the EU. The former CFSP 
High RepUHVHQWDWLYH H[SOLFLWO\ PDGH WKLV SRLQW LQ WHUPV RI ȊUHVSHFWLQJ DQG SURPRWLQJ
the rule of law as well as fundamental rights and freedoms not only defines the EU but 
 
25 P. LEINO, 7KH-RXUQH\7RZDUGV$OOWKDWLV*RRGDQG%HDXWLIXO+XPDQ5LJKWVDQGȆ&RPPRQ9DOXHVȇ
as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law, in M. CREMONA, B. DE WITTE (eds), EU Foreign Relations 
Law; Constitutional Fundamentals, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 259 et seq., p. 265. 
26 L. PECH, 3URPRWLQJWKH5XOHRI/DZ$EURDG2QWKH(8ȇV/LPLWHG&RQWULEXWLon to the Shaping of an 
International Understanding of the Rule of Law, in D. KOCHENOV, F. AMTENBRINK (eds), The European Un-
LRQȇV6KDSLQJRIWKH ?QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO2UGHU, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 129. 
27 M. KURKI, Fuzzy Liberalism and EU Democracy Promotion: Why Concepts Matter, cit. 
28 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, A Global Strategy for the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQȇV)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\6KDUHG9LVLRQ&RPPRQ$FWLRQ$6WURQJHU Europe, cit. 
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is also in our interHVWȋ29 7KH(8ȇVVWDWHG emphasis is on long-term, incremental changes 
rather than short-term achievements,30 though this is brought into question (to take an 
example from the case study here) by the speed at which accession negotiations were 
promised in return for enhanced migration cooperation with Turkey in early 2016. It 
would be naïve to suggest that the EU engages in democracy promotion without any 
RWKHULQWHUHVWVDWVWDNH7KH(8ȇVLQWHUQDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVDUHLQKHUHQWO\FRQQHFWHGWRLWV
external engagements, and tied to the legally-based inducements it can offer.31 The ne-
gotiations with Turkey over an arrangement WRȊUHGXFHWKHLOOHJDOIORZRIPLJUDQWVȋRIIHU
specific advantages but in exchange for security assurances rather than democratic im-
provements.32 Whilst this seems to undermine the central claims of the EU as a norma-
WLYHSRZHULWKLJKOLJKWVWKHQHHGWRXQGHUVWDQGZKHUHHOVHLQWKH(8ȇVHQJDJHPHQWZLWK
7XUNH\GHPRFUDF\SURPRWLRQWDNHVSODFHHVSHFLDOO\ȊXQGHUWKHUDGDUȋDQGEH\RQGRIIi-
cial engagements with central government, to better our understanding and evaluation. 
*LYHQWKH7UHDW\ODQJXDJHDFURVVWKH(8ȇVIRUHLJQSROLF\GLVFRXUVHDERXWWKHLPSRr-
tance of democratisation and human rights, it is tempting to focus attention solely on 
those actions which are taken with the express/stated purpose of influencing the de-
mocratic development of third States. Political scientists have extensively theorised the 
ways in which norms can be transmitted from the EU to third States via their interac-
WLRQV0DQQHUVȇQRUPGLIIXVLRQWKHVis recognises the different ways that norms transfer 
as a process including via contagion, procedural diffusion and transference.33 Norms 
can be transferred via long-term processes of socialization ZKHUHE\WKHȊWDUJHWȋ6tate is 
exposed to the norms and values of the EU and eventually adopts them) or by strategic 
calculation by the third State in return for a particular advantage or benefit. Schimmelf-
ennig and Sedelmeier conceptualized the transfer in the context of Central and Eastern 
Europe via the external incentives model (based on the logic of consequences) or the 
social learning model (based on the logic of appropriateness and domestically driven 
processes.34 
 
29 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines: Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
of March 2009, www.consilium.europa.eu, p. 3. 
30 Council Conclusions of 17 November 2009 on 'HPRFUDF\6XSSRUWLQWKH(8ȇV([WHUQDO5HODWLRQV, 
point 4. 
31 See for example the analysis of the security and normative considerations in visa liberalization 
polLF\ LQ WKH (8ȇV QHLJKERXUKRRG L. DELCOUR, S. FERNANDES, Visa Liberalization PURFHVVHV LQ WKH (8ȇV
Eastern Neighbourhood: Understanding Policy Outcomes, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
2016, p. 1259 et seq. 
32 Communication COM(2016) 166 of 16 March 2016 from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Council on next operational steps in the EU-Turkey 
cooperation in the field of migration. 
33 I. MANNERS, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, cit. 
34 F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, U. SEDELMEIER (eds), The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005. 
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The analysis in this Article accepts that norms can transfer in different ways. The 
emphasis here is less how the norms are accepted or resisted by the target, but the 
processes through which they are observable. Many of the features examined can be 
understood in terms of a democracy promotion strategy on the part of the EU.35 How-
ever, it is also possible that the promotion of democracy is secondary to other aims 
pursued by the EU, or even as a by-product. That is to say that democracy promotion 
need not be explicitly labelled as such but can be understood to be a reflection of how 
the EU presents itself to the world and engages with third States (or, for that matter, 
within international organisations or multilateral frameworks). In doing so, neglected or 
unseen aspects of the EU putting its values into action can be observed. It must also be 
borne in mind that democracy promotion is an integral part of EU foreign and enlarge-
ment policies, but not merely that which is the prerogative of the Council and Commis-
sion. National and sub-national actors or individuals (such as MEPs) can be engaged in 
EU democracy promotion too.36 Nevertheless, the institutional focus of the analysis 
here is generally limited to the roles played by the Commission, Council or Parliament 
since these are institutions that, individually or collectively, represent the EU. 
A four-part classification is used to shed light on the different ways in which democ-
racy promotion occurs.37 $ȊSRVLWLYHȋDQGȊH[SUHVVȋPHDQVRIGHPRFUDF\SURPRWLRQUe-
fers to the dominant logic of an inducement to improve some aspect of the third SWDWHȇV
democracy. The range of inducements on offer as well as the means vary considerably 
EXW WKH XQGHUO\LQJ UDWLRQDOH LV ȊUHLQIRUFHPHQW E\ UHZDUGȋ38 Inducements may be 
FRXFKHGLQJHQHUDOWHUPVDQGQRWȊFRQFUHWHȋEXWUDWKHUVWHSVWRZDUGVUHDFKLQJDSDr-
ticular benefit, though the promotion of democracy as the means to the end will be ex-
plicit. Though the inducement is usually offered to the government of the third State, 
this might not always be the case: direct funding to non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) by the EU is an example of positive democracy promotion as a means to achieve 
better democratic participation. Although many instances of positive democracy pro-
motion could be seen through the prism of conditionality, the scope of the category is 
wider since it is not necessarily the case that the inducement is directly tied to democ-
ratic progress only by the government. 
Ȋ1HJDWLYHȋ DQG ȊH[SUHVVȋ GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ DSSHDUV WR EH D FRQWUDGLFWLRQ LQ
WHUPVVLQFHWKHQDWXUHRIȊSURPRWLRQȋVXJJHVWVDSRVLWLYHRUȊJLYLQJȋDFWLRn. But in ef-
 
35 R. YOUNGS, Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy, Brussels: Centre for Eu-
ropean Policy Studies, 2001. 
36 N. GORDON, S. PARDO, Normative Power Europe and the Power of the Local, in Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2015, p. 416 et seq. 
37 P.J. CARDWELL, 0DSSLQJ2XW'HPRFUDF\3URPRWLRQLQWKH(8ȇV([WHUQDO5HODWLRQV, cit. 
38 F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, S. ENGERT, H. KNOBEL, Costs, Commitment and Compliance. The Impact of EU 
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 2003, p. 
496. 
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fect it operates within the same logic as positive, express democracy promotion. That is 
to say that unless the third State improves or rectifies a situation of concern, then a 
benefit or potential benefit will be withdrawn, or the EU will seek to invoke punitive 
PHDVXUHVVXFKDVVDQFWLRQV7KHWKUHDWRIGRLQJVRLVDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIȊQHJDWLYHȋGe-
mocracy promotion. One of the main differences with positive, express democracy 
promotion is that the focus is far more on the governmental organs of a third State 
than other, non-State actors.  
The analysis here accounts for instances of EU activity which can be understood as 
democracy promotion, but without explicit reference to doing so. The analysis therefore 
DYRLGVWKHGLVWLQFWLRQRIȊKDUGȋDQGȊVRIWȋGHPRFUDF\SURPRWLRQ39 or one that regards 
law as being only prescriptive or one-dimensional. The wide conceptualisation of de-
PRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ WKHUHIRUH LQFOXGHV ȊLPSOLHGȋ PHDQV E\ ZKLFK WKH (8 DWWHPSWV WR
engage in democracy in a positive or negative ZD\Ȋ3RVLWLYHȋDQGȊLPSOLHGȋGHPRFUDF\
promotion refers to instances where the EU is projecting a vision of democracy and/or 
democratic values in its external relations towards a third country, even though these 
are not expressly stated as an aim. This might involve in the sharing of or exposure to 
EU values, such as invitations to join EU-led civil society networks, joint parliamentary 
DVVHPEOLHVRUȊWZLQQLQJȋSURMHFWVDOORIZKLFKDUHIRXQGHGRQWKHYDOXHVRIGHPRFUDWLF
participation and representation and are integral to the rule of law. 
7KHILQDOFDWHJRU\ȊQHJDWLYHȋDQGȊLPSOLHGȋGHPRFUDF\SURPRWLRQLVWKHPRVWGLIIi-
cult to identify in terms of its contents, since it refers to instances without express ref-
erence to promoting democracy by withdrawing something, downgrading relations or 
even the threat of punitive measures. Nevertheless, the case is made here that negative 
implied democracy promotion is not only possible but already present. For example, 
the EU might imply to a third State that relations suffer because of a lack of democratic 
progress and that they could be improved by following the example of a neighbouring 
State who improved their levels of democracy (either generally or in specific areas). This 
LVSDUWLFXODUO\HYLGHQWZLWKLQWKH(8ȇVneighbouring geographic regions of the Mediter-
ranean and Eastern Europe. 
The argument is made in this Article that all four categories of democracy promo-
WLRQDUHYLVLEOH LQ WKH(8ȇV UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK7XUNH\DQGWDNHQWRJHWKHUDOOHQULFKRXU
understanding of contemporary democracy promotion. For the reasons explained in 
the following section, the relationship with Turkey is notable for its depth and longevity 
DPRQJVWDOOWKH(8ȇVOLQNVZLWKWKLUGStates. Before exploring each category in detail, the 
context and content of the relationship needs further exploration. 
 
39 T. RISSE, N. BABAYAN, Democracy Promotion and the Challenges of Illiberal Regional Powers, in 
Democratization, 2015, p. 382. 
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The EU-Turkey relationship is complex, deep and often under close scrutiny. It is above 
all longstanding: the EEC-Turkey customs agreement (1963) was among the first of its 
kind and represented an institutionalisation of the relationship long before others with 
non-EEC States. Turkey has been a key focus of the development of European foreign 
policy, dating back to European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s.40 Contacts be-
tween the EU institutions are therefore not at the embryonic stage. Rather, institutional 
FRQWDFWVDUHGHHS7XUNH\LVFRYHUHGE\ȊLQWHUQDOȋ(8SROLF\DVSDUWRIa Customs Union) 
and external relations via enlargement, neighbourhood policies and the Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP). For the latter, it is both an insider (as it is offered the 
opportunity to participate in CFSP activities and align with Declarations) and an out-
sider. 
Turkey is a longstanding member of European-focussed organisations including the 
Council of Europe (since 1949), NATO (since 1952), the Organisation for Economic Coo-
peration and Development (OECD) (since 1961), and the Conference (later the Organiza-
tion) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) (since 1975). But realising 
7XUNH\ȇVDPELWLRQWRMRLQWKH(8KDVEHHQDYHU\VORZSURFHVVZLWKUHODWLYHO\IHZȊPLOe-
VWRQHVȋ ?WLVWKHRQO\FDQGLGDWHZKHUH(XURSHDQOHDGHUVKDYHEHHQDPELYDOHQWRUHYHQ
openly hostile to membership,41 E\TXHVWLRQLQJZKHWKHULWȊEHORQJVȋLQ(XURSH42 This is 
ERXQGXSLQEURDGHUTXHVWLRQVRI ?VODPȇVSODFHLQ(XURSH43 and populist shifts in some 
Member States which have brought Turkish (potential) membership to the fore.44 
7XUNH\ DSSOLHG IRU PHPEHUVKLS LQ  EXW WKH &RPPLVVLRQȇV  opinion cited 
macro-economic instabilities and continuing human rights violations after the 1980 mili-
tary coup as reasons why Turkey should not yet join. Turkey entered a Customs Union 
with the EU in 1995, but was not granted candidate status until the 1999 Helsinki Coun-
cil. Other countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean have leap-
frogged Turkey and acceded after much shorter periods, before accession negotiations 
 
40 M.E. SMITH, (XURSHȇV)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 
109-110. 
41 7KHVHDUJXPHQWVKDYHEHHQPDGHWKURXJKRXW7XUNH\ȇVFDQGLGDF\EXWDSSHDUPRVWRIWHQZKHQD
new stage in the process is on the horizon. Most notably in recent years, President Sarkozy of France, 
ZKRZLWK*HUPDQ&KDQFHOORU0HUNHOEORFNHGWKHRSHQLQJRIȊFKDSWHUVȋLQWKHDFFHVVLRQSURFHVVLQ
+H ODWHUGHFODUHGWKDW7XUNH\ LVQRWHOLJLEOH WR MRLQEHFDXVH LW LV ȊLQ $VLD0LQRUQRW(XURSHȋM.B., P.P., 
Sarkozy: La Turquie dans l'UE? "Une erreur monumentale", 2 December 2015, www.europe1.fr. 
42 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, 7XUNH\ȇV 3ROLWLFDO 5HIRUPV DQG WKH  ?PSDFW RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ, in South 
European Society and Politics, 2005, p. 18. 
43 E. HUGHES, 7XUNH\ȇV$FFHVVLRQWRWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, p. 165. 
44 For example, in the U.ȇV(8 referendum in June 2016, the official Leave campaign claimed that 
Ȋ7XUNH\LVMRLQLQJWKH(8ȋDQGWKDWIUHHPRYHPHQWULJKWVZRXOGEHH[WHQGHGWRPLOOLRQ7XUNV7KHODFN
of progress in the enlargement negotiations, making membership only a distant prospect, was not high-
lighted. 
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eventually started in 2005. The accession process has not moved at a regular pace and 
for several years had seen scant progress. The ability of the EU to engage in rule trans-
fer on political reforms was thus diminished.45 EU-Turkey relations suddenly became 
more intense, and intensely scrutinised, in early 2016 as a result of increasing numbers 
of individuals attempting to reach Greece via the Turkish coast. The statement con-
cluded between the EU and Turkey on migration cooperation in March 2016 came with 
a promise of opening enlargement acquis chapters and reversing the stagnated pace of 
accession.  
The focus on migration cooperation did not however herald a shift in gear in acces-
sion negotiations. The attempted FRXSGȇ«WDW in July 2016 and subsequent crackdown by 
the Turkish government on journalists, academics and civil society have led to increas-
ing calls (including by the European Parliament) to suspend accession negotiations.46 
Turkish leaders have been more ambivalent about whether to continue to pursue EU 
membership as a goal. Although the official position is that Turkey and the EU remain 
committed to the process, there seems little likelihood that accession negotiations will 
pick up pace in the short to medium term. Nevertheless, the numerous and wide-
ranging engagement activities (some of which are explored below) continue. Examining 
long-term democracy promotion remains a worthwhile endeavour and the actions of 
the central government need not mean that EU activities are futile. 
Under the political dominance of President Recep Tayyip ErGRáDQDQGWKHAdalet ve 
.DONóQPD 3DUWLVL (AKP) party since 2002, relations with the EU and its Member States 
have varied considerably, from high points of international cooperation activities and 
occasional steps forward towards accession, to low points including very public dis-
agreements, as demonstrated by an unprecedented diplomatic spat with Germany and 
the Netherlands in March 2017.47 (UGRáDQKDVEURNHQZLWKSDVWOHDGHUVLQEHLQJPRUH
forthright about a more prominent role for Islam in Turkish society and critical of Euro-
SHDQFRXQWULHVȇWUHDWPHQWRI0XVOLPPLQRULWLHV48 As a result of European ambivalence 
WRPHPEHUVKLSDQGLWVJURZLQJHFRQRPLFVWUHQJWK7XUNH\ȇVRZQIRUHLJQSROLF\KDVDp-
peared to focus greater attention on its region, and further afield.49 %DġHUKDVFKDUDc-
 
45 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, The European Union and Turkey: Transforming the European Periphery into 
European Borderlands, 2016, EUI Working Paper RSCAS, no. 12, 2016, p. 4. 
46 European Parliament Resolution 2016/2993 (RSP) of 24 November 2016 on EU-Turkey relations.  
47 In advance of a referendum on changes to the Turkish constitution, Germany and the Netherlands 
refused to permit Turkish Ministers to address pro-government rallies in their countries. President 
Erdoáan lambasted the governments, accusing them of Nazi-like behaviour. 
48 E. KIRDIĠ, Immoderation: Comparing the Christian Right in the US and Pro-Islamic Movement-
Parties in Turkey, in Democratization, 2016, p. 430. 
49 D. GÜNAY, Europeanization of State Capacity and Foreign Policy: Turkey in the Middle East, in 
Mediterranean Politics, 2014, p. 220 et seq.; H. TARIK Oà8=/8, Turkish Foreign Policy at the Nexus of 
Changing International and Regional Dynamics, in Turkish Studies, 2016, p. 59. 
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WHULVHGWKLVVKLIWDVUHSUHVHQWLQJȊDPRUHDFWLYHDQGDPELWLRXVȋIRUHLJQSROLF\50 though 
others have claimed that the shift can be exSODLQHG LQ WHUPV RI ȊKLVWRULFDOO\ FKDQJLQJ
strategies of social reproduction of the Ottoman and Turkish States in response to 
FKDQJLQJGRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWVȋ51 In any event, the emphasis on a 
regional focus marks the emergence of Turkey itself as a normative foreign policy actor 
in its region, which makes Turkey and the EU potential competitors in the promotion of 
norms.52 
Enlargement is not therefore the only prism through which to see EU-Turkey rela-
tions. Similarly, democracy promotion is only one aspect of the relationship, sitting 
alongside an increasing focus on the role of Turkey in the mLJUDWLRQȊFULVLVȋDQGSDUWLFu-
larly those fleeing neighbouring Syria. This makes the implied categories of democracy 
promotion potentially richer in content. Yet, of all the challenges, Turkish democracy 
has been a major sticking point. Turkey is ranked lower than all Member States and 
other candidates in international democracy indexes. For example, it sits at number 97 
RI  LQ WKH ZRUOG DQG SDUW RI WKH ȊK\EULG UHJLPHVȋ RI FDWHJRU\ DFFRUGLQJ WR the 
Economist Intelligence Unit.53 )XDW.H\PDQDQG*¾P¾ġ©¾KDYHFKDUDFWHULVHG7XUNH\ȇV
current position as being at the crossroads between democratic consolidation or ero-
sion.54 Nevertheless, in the context of the Mediterranean, Turkey is ranked higher than 
most other States (except Israel and Tunisia) and has itself been involved in democracy 
promotion in the region following the Arab Spring55 as a means of seeking a role as a 
regional actor.56 *XQD\ILQGVWKDW7XUNH\ȇVWLHVWRWKH(8DQGFDQGLGDWHVWDWXVDOORZHGLW
to have greater influence over other Mediterranean States.57 
The case study of Turkey thus allows a rich exploration of the different types of de-
mocracy promotion employed by the EU over a significant time period. The uniqueness 
of the EU-Turkey relationship in terms of its longevity, depth and multiple framings 
mean that this exploration should not be regarded as how democracy promotion oper-
ates with other countries near to and far from the EU. It is also important to avoid Euro-
 
50 E.T. B$Ġ(5, Shift-of-Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy, in Turkish Studies, 2015, p. 305. 
51 C. HOFFMAN, C. CEMGIL, The (Un)Making of the Pax Turca in the Middle East: Understanding the 
Social-historical Roots of Foreign Policy, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2016, p. 1280. 
52 E. PARLAR DAL, $VVHVVLQJ7XUNH\
VȊ1RUPDWLYHȋ3RZHULQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQG1RUWK$IULFD5HJLRQ, in 
Turkish Studies, 2013, p. 709 et seq. 
53 Economist Intelligence Unit, Revenge of WKH Ȋ'HSORUDEOHVȋ, in The Economist, 31 March 2017, 
www.eiuperspectives.economist.com. 
54 E. FUAT KEYMAN, Ġ GÜMÜĠÇÜ, Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2014. 
55 Z. Ö1 ?Ġ, Turkey and the Arab Revolutions, in Mediterranean Politics, 2014, p. 203 et seq. 
56 B. AYATA, Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World, in Journal of European Integration, 2015, 
p. 95 et seq. 
57 D. GÜNAY, Europeanization of State Capacity and Foreign Policy: Turkey in the Middle East, cit., p. 
231. 
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centric assumptions that changes in Turkey are necessarily and solely prompted by ef-
forts by the EU. In particular, the advantages on offer as part of the enlargement proc-
ess may be given as a result of other factors. The strategic role of Turkey in preventing 
migration flows to Europe and the granting of aid packages to do so is one prominent 
example, and one where the EU risks putting in danger its claim to be a normative 
power insofar as the questionable interpretation of international refugee law applies.58 
$V7DUóN2áX]OXKDVQRWHG 
Ȋ[t]he Europeans assume that in return for EU's financial aid to Turkey to help lessen 
Turkey's burden, opening some chapters in accession negotiations, and provision of 
visa-free travel to Turkish citizens in the Schengen area in late 2016, Turkey will likely co-
operate with the EU in finding a remedy to the Syrian refugee crisis within Turkey's terri-
WRU\ȋ59 
)XUWKHUPRUHWKDWDQ\PRYHVWRZDUGVȊ(XURSHDQLVDWLRQȋ LQFOXGLQJZKDWZHPLJKW
see as consolidating democracy) may not only be accounted for by EU conditionality 
and incentive-based models, but domestic drivers of change, including from business 
groups, NGOs and civil society.60 It is important not to see democracy promotion merely 
through the relationship between the national government and the EU institutions, or 
the rhetoric of political leaders. Rather, as some of the instances examined below dem-
RQVWUDWHWKHȊERWWRPXSȋDSSURDFKZKLFKHQJDJHVHQWLWLHVRWKHUWKDQWKHFHQWUDOJRv-
ernment with the EU show on the one hand the wide scope of democracy promotion 
and the importance of focusing on democratisation as a long-term process.  
The categorisation of democracy promotion with third States was introduced in section 
II above. The following sections illustrate examples of democracy promotion across the 
positive/negative and express/implied categories in the case of the EU-Turkey relation-
ship. 
 
58 I. MANNERS, Normative Power Europe Reconsidered, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2006, p. 
p. 194. 
59 H. TARIK Oà8=/8, Turkish Foreign Policy at the Nexus of Changing International and Regional 
Dynamics, cit., p. 64. 
60 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, 7XUNH\ȇV3ROLWLFDO5HIRUPVDQGWKH ?PSDFWRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ, cit.; G. YILMAZ, 
EU Conditionality Is Not the Only Game in Town! Domestic Drivers of Turkey's Europeanization, in Turkish 
Studies, 2014, p. 303 et seq. 
 
14 Paul James Cardwell 
7KLVGLPHQVLRQWR WKH(8ȇVGHPRFUDF\SURPRWLRQ LV WKHPRVWUHDGLO\ LGHQWLILDEOHThis 
category covers self-standing or over-arching measures designed to increase, in some 
way, democracy and democratic development in Turkey.  
The enlargement process is the prime example in this category. Enlargement is a 
legal process according to which, as Art. 49 TEU makes clear, begins with the application 
RIDȊ(XURSHDQ6WDWHȋWREHFRPHDPHPEHU7KHSURFHVVRIMRLQLQJLVKRZHYHURZQHG
and managed by the EU institutions which ultimately assess whether the State is ready 
to join. Enlargement is included in this category because it is the most obvious way in 
which a specific advantage (full EU membership) can reward democratic progress 
(though for European States only). Nevertheless, as a wide-ranging and multifaceted 
process, aspects of the enlargement process can also be understood as fitting into 
other categories too. It is therefore important to distinguish the elements which are 
positive/express here. Further, as Turkey is not (yet) a Member State, the emphasis here 
is on enlargement as a process rather than a fait accompli. A linear account of enlarge-
ment alone is unlikely to account for domestic change in Turkey over the longer term, 
HVSHFLDOO\VLQFHWKHOHQJWKRIWLPHZKLFKKDVSDVVHGVLQFH7XUNH\ȇVRULJLQDODSSOLFDWLRQ
to join.61  
At the most general level, each of the significant milestones of the enlargement 
process (accepting an application for membership, recognising a country as a candidate 
and beginning the formal process of negotiation) rests on an evaluation of the level of 
democracy in a third State. The requirement of a democratic system of government as a 
prerequisite to even consider an application for EU membership was established long-
before the EU developed specific approaches to democracy promotion. In 1978, the 
European Council sSHFLILHGWKDWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\LVDQȊHVVHQWLDOHOHPHQWȋIRU
membership and was tested first in the accession negotiations of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal.62 The Copenhagen Criteria (1993) set out the democratic credentials for future 
Member States more comprehensively. 
7KHUHFRJQLWLRQRI7XUNH\ȇV(8FDQGLGDWXUHLQLPPHGLDWHO\VSXUUHGDSHULRGRI
democratic reforms and constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002.63 Two 
concrete examples are provided by the abolition of the death penalty, which is consid-
ered by the EU to be an essential element of a fully democratic State, and the provision 
of cultural rights (in broadcasting and education) for the Kurdish minority. Both are di-
 
61 N. TOCCI, Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?, in South European Society and 
Politics, 2005, p. 73 et seq. 
62 N. GHAZARYAN, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 118. 
63 E. ÖZBUDUN, Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993Ȃ2004, in Turkish Studies, 2007, p. 179 et 
seq.; G. GÜNLÜK-ĠENESEN, H. KIRIK, The AKP Era: Democratization or Resecuritization?, in Research and 
Policy on Turkey, 2016, p. 75 et seq. 
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rectly linked to progress in the enlargement process and were achieved via a legislative 
package in 2002, as a direct result of the 1999 recognition of candidate status.64 Much 
of the literature on the EU and Turkey published in the mid-2000s focussed on the path 
Turkey seemed to be taking towards EU membership, however differentiated from 
other candidates past and present.65 Yet for Turkey, the evolution has been from one 
where fulfilling the entry criteria would result in membership, to one where even fulfill-
ing all the criteria does not if the EU does not have the capacity tR ȊDEVRUEȋ WKHQHZ
Member State.66 
Democratisation is not a tick box operation, and the EU institutions and Member 
States were criticised for not ensuring the consolidation of democracy in Romania and 
Bulgaria before their accession.67 The steps of the enlargement process that, at this 
stage, can be measured by the opening and closing of more than 30 chapters of the ac-
quis WKHUHIRUH LOOXVWUDWH WKH ȊSRVLWLYHȋ LQFHQWLYHRQRIIHU/HJDOVFKRODUVKDYHFULWLFLVHG
the shortcomings of conditionality as failing to embed democracy fully before EU mem-
bership.68 But there is little doubt within the enlargement process of the central place of 
democratic development as a key factor. This is particularly the case for Turkey: the 
&RPPLVVLRQȇVDQQXDOUHSRUWRQ7XUNH\ȇVSrogress in the enlargement process de-
votes 20 of the 88 pages to political reforms, compared to only five for economic re-
forms, before even the specific acquis are considered. Within the latter, several can be 
seen as fitting with the positive/express category. In particular, chapter 23 on the judici-
DU\DQG IXQGDPHQWDO ULJKWV VWDWHV WKDW Ȋ>a] proper functioning judicial system and ef-
fective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is the respect for fun-
damental rights in law and in practiceȋDQGJRHVRQWR OLVW7XUNH\ȇVVXFFHVVHVDQGIDLl-
ures in this respect.69 In the opening paragraphs, the Commission comments that:  
Ȋ2SHQLQJEHQFKPDUNVIRU&KDSWHUV>MXGLFLDU\DQGIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV@DQG>MXVWLFH
freedom and security] on the rule of law still need to be defined so as to provide Turkey 
with a roadmap for reforms in this essential area. Turkey can accelerate the pace of ne-
gotiations by advancing in the fulfilment of the benchmarks, meeting the requirements 
 
64 F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, S. ENGERT, H. KNOBEL, Costs, Commitment and Compliance. The Impact of EU 
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, cit., p. 508. 
65 For example, H. ARIKAN, Turkey and the EU, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 
66 A.R. USUL, Is There Any Hope of the Revival of EU-Turkey RHODWLRQV LQ WKHȊ1HZ(UDȋ", in Turkish 
Studies, 2014, p. 289. 
67 A.B. SPENDZHAROVA, M.A. VACHUDOVA, Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and 
Romania after EU Accession, in West European Politics, 2012, p. 39 et seq. 
68 D. KOCHENOV, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality, The Hague: Kluwer, 2008. 
69 Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2015) 216 final of 10 November 2015, Turkey 2015 
Report Ȃ Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
2015 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy COM(2015) 611 final, www.ec.europa.eu, p. 55. 
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of the negotiating framework and by respecting its contractual obligations towards the 
(8ȋ70 
Previous reports have made comments on similar lines. Whilst the Commission 
PLJKWEHDFFXVHGRIVLQJOLQJRXW7XUNH\E\ȊRYHUDWWHQWLYHQHVVȋ71 the explicit linking of 
progress with pace of reforms makes the positive/express categorisation of this type of 
democracy promotion clear. 
Although the enlargement process provides the foundation for the contemporary 
EU-Turkey relationship, other instances of positive/express democracy promotion are 
present too. Turkey is one of only a handful of countries in which more than 25 projects 
have been run under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) programme (Nepal, Russia, Venezuela and States in the Western Balkans are 
others) which effectively allows the EU to engage in positive, express democracy promo-
tion in a third State without the permission of the host government.72 Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig have termed this bottom-XSDSSURDFK ȊOLQNDJHȋ ZKLFK IDFLOLWDWHVFRn-
tact beyond the level of central government departments.73 The ongoing civil society 
dialogue between Turkey and the EU awarded grants to 199 projects between 2006-
2009 and is co-funded by the EU and Turkey.74 Whilst the legal basis is separate to the 
enlargement process, the dialogue offers an insight for the EU institutions which in turn 
LQIRUPV WKH &RPPLVVLRQȇV UHSRUWV RQ 7XUNH\ȇV UHDGLQHVV IRU PHPEHUVKLS75 The EU 
GHDOVGLUHFWO\ZLWK1*2VDVȊKXPDQULJKWVGHIHQGHUVȋE\LVVXLQJJUDQWVIRUSURMHFWVRQ
developing civil society, often with a technical (and thus less ostensibly political) focus. 
7KH(8KDVDGRSWHGD ȊORFDOVWUDWHJ\ȋRQ7XUNH\ZKLFKSRLQWV WRDUHDVZKHUH7XUNLVK
democracy and the protection of human rights is believed to be lacking.76 As these two 
examples demonstrate that positive/express democracy promotion instruments are 
fully in evidence here, the analysis now turns to express measures which are negative, 
rather than positive. 
 
70 Ibid., p. 4. 
71 C. BALKIR, M. AKNUR, Different Trajectories yet the Same Substance: Croatia and Turkey, in A. 
WETZEL, J. ORBIE (eds), The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015, p. 85 et 
seq. 
72 R. YOUNGS, Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy, cit., p. 31. 
73 S. LAVENEX, F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to 
Governance?, in Democratization, 2011, p. 885 et seq. 
74 C. BALKIR, M. AKNUR, Different Trajectories yet the Same Substance: Croatia and Turkey, cit., p. 103. 
75 Communication (COM)2016 166, cit., p. 13. 
76 European Union local strategy in Turkey to support and defend Human Rights Defenders (HRDs), 
European Union Local Strategy to Support and Defend Human Rights Defenders in Turkey, 2015, 
www.avrupa.info.tr. 
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A promotion measure which is negatively expressed generally refers to the means the 
EU has at its disposal which can be engaged to withdraw a benefit it offers to a third 
State, in order to prompt rectification of an issue of concern. In a sense, these are the 
ȊVWLFNȋ FRXQWHUSDUWV WR WKH ȊFDUURWVȋ LQ Whe previous section within the enlargement 
SURFHVV  ?W LV H[SUHVVHG LQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQȇV UHSRUWV RQ 7XUNH\ WKDW SURJUHVV LQ WKH
enlargement process, towards the end goal of becoming a Member State, cannot be 
achieved without democratic improvement. As such, positive and negative efforts form 
DȊSXVK-SXOOȋHIIHFWZKLFKLVDOVRVXEMHFWWRFKDQJHVRYHUWLPHHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHGUDZQ-
out case of Turkish membership.77  
The enlargement process thus incorporates negative/express democracy promo-
tion. Official criticism of Turkey by the EU institutions or Member States is often explic-
itly linked to a stalling of the enlargement process (and a reminder of the economic 
benefits of EU membership). Examples of this include aspects of the local strategy on 
human rights and democracy and negative judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights against Turkey78 ZKLFK WKHQ IHHG LQWR WKH&RPPLVVLRQȇVHYDOXDWLRQRISURJUHVV
DQGLQWXUQWKH&RXQFLOȇVGHFLVLRQWRRSHQFKDSWHUVIRUQHJRWLDWLRQV79 Perceived back-
sliding on democratic progress, such as floating the return of the death penalty by the 
government, is generally followed by a warning from the EU institutions that this would 
prevent or disrupt negotiations.80 
Usually, the means by which this type of democracy promotion is visible is in the 
(8ȇVLQWHUQDWLRQDODJUHHPHQWVZLWKWKLUGFRXQWULHV6LQFHWKHJURZWKLQH[WHUQDODJUHe-
ments during the 1990s, the EU has insisted on incorporating democracy and human 
rights clauses as essentials elements in its agreements with third States.81 The clauses 
DUH W\SLFDOO\ ZRUGHG WR FRYHU ȊVXEVWDQWLDO YLRODWLRQVȋ IRU ZKLFK SURFHGXUHV RI ȊVSHFLDO
 
77 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union, in Middle East Studies, 
1998, p. 255; A.R. USUL, Is There any Hope of the Revival of EU-Turkey RHODWLRQVLQWKHȊ1HZ(UDȋ", cit. 
78 The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is not 
an EU instrument but all candidates are expected to be signatories. Turkey ratified the Convention in 
1953, but has been one of the countries found most regularly to have breached its rights by the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights. The Turkish government issued a derogation from the Convention in July 2016 
following the attempted FRXSGȇ«WDW. See further, B. BAGLAYAN, Turkey Declares State of Emergency and 
Derogates from ECHR After Failed CRXSGȇÉtat, in Leiden Law Blog, 8 August 2016, leidenlawblog.nl.  
79 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, The European Union and Turkey: Transforming the European Periphery into 
European Borderlands, cit., pp. 5-6. 
80 S. E5.8Ġ, EU Remains Against Death Penalty in Turkey, in Hurriyet Daily News, 16 February 2015, 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com. 
81 7KHZRUGLQJ LVJHQHUDOO\DVIROORZVȊ5HVSHFW IRUGHPRFUDWLFSULQFLSOHVDQGIXQGDPHQWDOKXPDQ
rights, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as for the principle of the rule of 
law, underpins the internal and international policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element 
RIWKLV$JUHHPHQWȋ 
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XUJHQF\ȋ PD\ EH HQJDJHG Lncluding the suspension of the agreement. These clauses 
are heralded as a key factor in the practical application of normative power EU. In real-
LW\ DFWLYDWLRQ LV UDUH DQG WKH &RPPLVVLRQ DGPLWV WKDW ȊGLDORJXH DQG SHUVXDVLRQȋ DQG
ȊSRVLWLYHDFWLRQȋLVSUHIHUUHGWRȊSHQDOWLHVȋ82 
The Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey (Ankara Agreement) does 
not include a human rights clause. Whilst this may not have been surprising at the initial 
entry into force of the agreement in 1964, the Association Council decision of 1995 es-
tablishing a customs union did not do so either.83 $OWKRXJK WKH LVVXH ZDV ȊKRWO\ Ge-
EDWHGȋ84 such clauses only became the norm in the period after 199585 and were not 
without legal controversy, as Portugal unsuccessfully challenged the inclusion of human 
rights clauses in agreements in the Court of Justice.86 However, Turkey is part of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) programme which includes a human rights 
clause as an essential element.87 Since Turkey is unusual amongst the EuroMed part-
ners as the only one involved in an enlargement process,88 there was no need for a 
specific EuroMed Association Agreement as with the other partners. 
Turkey has not been the target of any restrictive measures (sanctions) by the EU, 
which since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon have become ever more preva-
lent as a feature of EU external relations.89 As a third State, there is nothing that would 
 
82 European Commission, The European Union: Furthering Democracy and Human Rights Across the 
Globe, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007, 
www.ec.europa.eu. 
83 EC-Turkey Association Council Decision 1/95 of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final 
phase of the Customs Union. 
84 European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Human Rights and 
'HPRFUDF\&ODXVHV LQWKH(8ȇV ?QWHUQDWLRQDO$JUHHPHQWV, September 2005, www.europarl.europa.eu, p. 
6. 
85 Communication COM(1995) 216 final of 23 May 1995 from the Commission on the inclusion of 
respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third 
countries. 
86 Court of Justice, judgment of 3 December 1996, case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council of the European 
Union. 
87 Regulation (EC) 1488/96 of the Council of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to 
accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, Art. 3: Ȋ[t]his Regulation is based on respect for democratic principles and the 
rule of law and also for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which constitute an essential element 
thereof, the violation of which element will justify the adoption of appropriate measuresȋ. 
88 The Partnership was relaunched as the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, and States including 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro were also included in the framework. 
89 P.J. CARDWELL, The Legalisation of European Union Foreign Policy and the Use of Sanctions, in 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 2015, p. 287; C. PORTELA, How the EU Learned to Love 
Sanctions, in M. LEONARD (ed.), Connectivity Wars: Why Migration, Finance and Trade are the Geo-
economic Battlegrounds of the Future, London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016, p. 36 et 
seq. 
([SODLQLQJWKH(8ȇV/HJDO2EOigation for Democracy Promotion 19 
prevent the imposition of sanctions by the EU if circumstances dictated, but there 
would need to be a serious deterioration in the democracy or human rights situation. 
The first step would likely be a halt to the enlargement negotiations. To date, this has 
QRWRFFXUUHG:KLOVWWKH(8KDVEHHQFULWLFDORIȊEDFNVOLGLQJȋ90 in Turkish democracy for 
several years, this criticism has not prevented the EU and its Member States seeking 
enhanced migration cooperation (which eYHQWXDOO\ WRRN WKH IRUP RI D ȊVWDWHPHQWȋ91 
with Turkey since early 2016. This demonstrates that whilst the EU institutions might 
engage in criticism and impose restrictive measures on third States, the political reali-
ties mean than a highly differentiated approach is followed. In summary, nega-
tive/express democracy promotion is therefore primarily evident in the EU-Turkey rela-
tionship within the context of the enlargement process. 
In this category, democracy promotion which is less tied to specific instruments to 
reach a certain goal, can be seen through the more gradual projection of values to-
wards a third SWDWH$VDQH[DPSOHRIWKH(8ȇVQRUPDWLYHSRZHUDWZRUNZHH[SHFWWR
see here a sharing of values but without express demands. 
Hence, a dividing line can be drawn between the express demands on Turkey via 
the enlargement process (positive/express), and the more gradual process of Europe-
anisation via multi-level engagement with Turkey.92 Europeanisation is not a singular 
concept, and given its malleability, particular readings could apply to other categories 
under examination in this Article. The particular reading of Europeanisation as under-
VWRRGKHUHLVȊWKHHPHrgence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning 
to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their do-
PHVWLFUXOHVWUXFWXUHVȋ93 This type of Europeanisation emerged as a characterisation of 
 
90 M. MÜFTÜLER BAÇ, The European Union and Turkey: Transforming the European Periphery into 
European Borderlands, cit., p. 7. 
91 7KHȊVWDWHPHQWȋLVQRWUHIHUUHGWRDVDQȊDJUHHPHQWȋVLQFHWKH(8ȇVFRPSHWHQFHVWRPDNHDJUHe-
ments were not used. Following a challenge to the legality of the statement in the General Court brought 
E\VHYHUDO3DNLVWDQLDQG$IJKDQQDWLRQDOVWKH&RXUWIRXQGWKDWWKHȊVWDWHPHQWȋLVQRWDQDJUHHPHQWDQG
therefore the judicial review procedure under Art. 263 could not be used. Furthermore, the view of the 
Court is that he statement was not made by the Council of the EU, but rather the Member States (in spite 
of it being termed the ȊEU-7XUNH\VWDWHPHQWȋ General Court, orders of 28 February 2017, cases T-192/16, 
T-193/16 and T-257/16, NF, NG and NM v. European Council. 
92 F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, S. ENGERT, H. KNOBEL, Costs, Commitment and Compliance. The Impact of EU 
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, cit.; F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, U. SEDELMEIER (eds), The 
Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, cit. 
93 T.A. BÖRZEL, Europeanisation Meets Turkey: A Case Sui Generis?, in Ç. NAS, Y. ÖZER (eds), Turkey and 
the European Union: Processes of Europeanisation, Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, p. 9 et seq., p. 218; T.A. 
BÖRZEL, D. SOYALTIN, G. YILMAZ, Same Same or Different? Accession Europeanization in Central and Eastern 
Europe and Turkey Compared, in A. TEKIN, A. GÜNAY (eds), The Europeanization of Turkey, Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015, p. 218. 
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what happens to actors (including Member States) within the EU, but has since been 
GHYHORSHGLQWRDPHDQVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJZKDWKDSSHQVEH\RQGWKH(8ȇVERUGHUV94 It is 
VRPHWLPHV XQGHUVWRRG DV D ȊERWWRP XSȋ Dpproach,95 which makes its characteristics 
appropriate to be included in the positive/implied category. Whilst this might be seen as 
little different to the instruments detailed in the positive/express category above, in-
stances in this implied category work in a different, more subtle way. Although the ex-
amples cited within this category are also covered by the enlargement process, since 
they are all commented upon in the enlargement reports, the claim here is that they 
would be likely to exist anyway because of the nature of Turkey as a large, neighbouring 
State with whom the EU will obviously (need to) engage with.  
Many of the instances included here also apply to other neighbourhood States in 
Eastern Europe and to a more limited extent, in the Mediterranean. Europeanisation is 
H[SUHVVHGWKURXJKWKHSURYLGLQJRIGRPHVWLFLQFHQWLYHVDQGDȊVHQVLWL]LQJȋRIH[SRVXUH
to EU values to domestic actors. In practice, positive/implied democracy promotion en-
gages both governmental, public organisations and NGO/civil society bodies though of-
ten in different ways. The common thread running through the numerous instances of 
the involvement and inclusion of the EU in Turkish civil society, directly with Parliamen-
tary groups, NGOs and institutions contributes to projecting a vision of liberal democ-
racy by exposure. This also includes the place of minorities96 and women97 in society, 
and well as more institutional-level initiatives, such as the inclusion of Turkey in the 
European Network of Ombudsmen.98 Therefore, this category captures ongoing proc-
esses which are often missed by the focus on TurNH\ȇVȊPDFUR-SROLWLFDOGHILFLHQFLHVȋ LQ
meeting the Copenhagen criteria for enlargement.99 
Two further examples (governmental and non-governmental) are as follows. First, 
Turkey and other candidate/neighbouring States are invited to align with CFSP Declara-
tions. Declarations are not legally enforceable, and the third States have no input into 
their content, but aligning States confirm that they will adjust national policies to con-
 
94 F. SCHIMMELFENNIG, U. SEDELMEIER (eds), The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, cit. 
95 S. JACQUOT, C. WOLL, Usage of European integration: Europeanisation from a Sociological 
Perspective, in European Integration Online Papers, 2003, eiop.or. 
96 G. YILMAZ, From EU Conditionality to Domestic Choice for Change: Exploring Europeanisation of 
Minority Rights in Turkey, in Ç. NAS, Y. ÖZER (eds), Turkey and the European Union, cit., p. 119 et seq. 
97 S.U. ÇUBUKÇU, Contribution to the Europeanisation Process: Demands for Democracy of Second 
Wave Feminism in Turkey, in Ç. NAS, Y. ÖZER (eds), Turkey and the European Union, cit., p. 141 et seq. 
98 P. KUBICEK, The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey, in Turkish Studies, 
2005, p. 363; Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2013) 417 final of 16 October 2013, Turkey 2013 
Progress Report Ȃ Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
2016 Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014 COM(2013) 700 final, eur-
lex.europa.eu, p. 10. 
99 T. DIEZ, A. AGNANTOPOULOS, A. KALIBER, Turkey, Europeanisation and Civil Society, in South European 
Society and Politics, 2005, p. 7. 
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firm with the text. The Declarations are usually critical of third States, with the most fre-
quent points of contention relating to democracy, the rule of law or human rights (such 
as unfair/illegitimate elections, treatment of minorities or use of the death penalty).100 
Turkey has aligned itself with approximately 60 percent of Declarations since 2005, 
though the annual rate has ranged between 40 and 80 percent. Whilst this practice is 
also commented on in the enlargement reports (as evidence of the required adaptation 
of national foreign policy to the CFSP), this process is also an example of sensitising the 
third countries to values that the EU seeks to promote. Whilst many of the Declarations 
seem anodyne, alignment might be domestically controversial in terms of the subject 
matter. For instance, for Declarations marking International Day against Homophobia, 
Turkey has sometimes aligned but more frequently has not. Thus, though the text of 
Declaration might be very generally worded, the very process of inviting Turkey and 
RWKHUVWRDOLJQLVDQLPSOLHGSURPRWLRQRIZKDWWKH(8FRQVLGHUVWREHSDUWRIȊLWVȋGe-
mocratic values, whether or not the third State aligns. The content is thus anything but 
anodyne for the third country in question in terms of how it wants to project itself to 
the wider world: expressing shared values with the EU or making a strategic calculation 
to do so. 
Second, at the non-governmental level, Noutcheva has highlighted Europeanisation 
as societal mobilisation and empowerment, as an alternative to élite empowerment.101 
7KLVUHOLHVRQDFFRXQWLQJIRUERWKWKH(8ȇVVWUXFWXUDOSRZHUDQGDFWRUQHVVZKLFKSHr-
mits understanding the role of the EU (across its institutions) as a diffuser of ideas. She 
makes the distinction between material assistance (which was covered in the posi-
WLYHH[SUHVVFDWHJRU\DERYHDQGWKHȊLGHDWLRQDOEDFNLQJRISURWHVWHYHQWVWULJJHUHGE\
government SROLFLHVWKDWIDOOVKRUWRIGHPRFUDWLFQRUPVȋ102  ?QSUDFWLFHWKH(8ȇVSUHVV
UHOHDVHV RQ HYHQWV DQG RIILFLDOVȇ PHHWLQJV ZLWK UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI VRFLDO PRYHPHQWV
risks destabilising relations with the government (which has certainly been the case 
with Turkey) but is a means of positively implying certain democratic values including 
plurality of political processes, rights of minorities etc. With these examples in mind, 
positive/implied democracy promotion here is expressed partly, though not exclusively, 
through the enlargement process but also through the frameworks for relations with 
neighbouring States. 
 
100 P.J. CARDWELL, Values in thH(XURSHDQ8QLRQȇV)RUHLJQ3ROLF\$Q$QDO\VLVDQG$VVHVVPHQWRI&)63
Declarations, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2016, p. 601 et seq. 
101 G. NOUTCHEVA, Societal Empowerment and Europeanization, in Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 2016, p. 691 et seq. 
102 Ibid., p. 5. [se il contributo nella nota precedente inizia a p. 691, come può questa nota far riferi-
mento a quello stesso contributo a p. 5?] 
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The final category of EU democracy promotion is the least readily identifiable since it 
involves looking beyond the actual or potential use of negative means, to instances 
where the negative dimension to democracy promotion is indirectly used. Covered here 
are instances where the EU has attempted to export its model of democracy or values, 
but in a way which is both masked by other aims and which purports to take away 
some perceived benefit to the third State. In a sense, the behaviour of the EU could be 
FKDUDFWHULVHGDVEHLQJȊSDVVLYHDJJUHVVLYHȋ103 In other words, democracy promotion is 
present as an aim but hidden from view which makes it difficult to readily regard it as a 
VLQJXODUȊVWUDWHJ\ȋRQWKHSDUWRIWKH(8 
As previously noted, it could be said that the existence of the human rights suspen-
sion clauses could fit within this category, since the EU institutions admit that these 
would only be triggered as a very last resort. The presence of these clauses function 
more as a threat for potential use. However, this category is much more open-textured. 
The negative/implied category points to instances where the target country in question 
is alerted to the fact that the EU is pursuing deeper cooperation (with the assumption of 
certain advantages to be gained by that country) with other, usually neighbouring, 
countries. The negative aspect is therefore that there is something in terms of its level 
of democracy which is preventing it from receiving such advantages that the EU is pre-
pared to give. The implied aspect is that it may not be done using express words. In 
some cases, the EU has used CFSP Declarations against countries which imply that 
negative effects of a poor relationship with the EU (because of a lack of democracy) 
prevent that country from enjoying the type of relationship or benefits the EU has to 
offer. Belarus is a clear example where this approach has been followed.  
With Turkey, the EU does not generally engage in the open criticism of the country 
beyond official documentation such as the enlargement reports. As such, the clearest 
example here is the pursuit of enlargement negotiations with other States, which ap-
plied after Turkey but joined before it and from a lower level of economic development 
(of which Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia stand out as examples). Of course, since this is 
implied then the reason may only be partly related to democracy, especially in the case 
of Turkey, the lack of progress towards full recognition of the government of Cyprus is a 
noted sticking point. But in response to Turkish complaints that it has been treated less 
favourably than other candidates, official speeches and documents from the EU institu-
tions imply that the sticking points are not merely formal ones which can be resolved in 
a straightforward fashion.  
With this in mind, this category can therefore include instances where there is no 
VSHFLILFȊER[ȋWREHWLFNHGand thus can be distinguished from, in particular, the nega-
 
103 I am grateful to Zsuzsanna Végh for pointing out this characterisation. 
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tive/express category. To give a practical example, on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-
gender (LGBT) ULJKWVWKH(8ȇVFRPPHQWVRQ7XUNH\DUHOHVVRQWKHIRUPDOQDWXUHRIOe-
gal protection for minorLWLHVEXW WKH ODFNRIDQȊDWPRVSKHUHRI WROHUDQFHȋDURXQGWKH
enforcement and recognition of rights.104 Therefore, the implication is that this slows 
the enlargement process without being framed explicitly as such (if it was, this would 
move into the negative/express category). But because it is not explicit, this practice 
speaks to the wider Turkey-specific issue of being seen as a European country capable 
of closer relations. The implication is that this enforcement of rights is expected of a 
European country, despite the continued lack of such enforcement in countries in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. 
This Article has sought to demonstrate, via the case study of Turkey, that the putting 
into practice of the Treaty obligation to promote democracy should not be viewed in a 
narURZZD\ZLWKRQO\PHFKDQLVPVVSHFLILFDOO\IODJJHGDVȊGHPRFUDF\SURPRWLRQȋWRROV
DVWKHRQO\RQHVZKLFKȊFRXQWȋ5DWKHUWKHUHDUHDKRVWRIPHDQVE\ZKLFKWKH(8Dt-
tempts to promote or support democracy in third countries and not all of them follow a 
singular, defined strategy. Some of these means are specific to the EU as a particular 
kind of international, non-State actor. Needless to say, all are likely to have varying lev-
els of success and the EU cannot and should not be understood as an organisation 
whose UDLVRQGȇ¬WUH is promoting democracy, despite what the Treaty text might indi-
cate.  
The nature of democracy promotion by the EU is frequently criticised for its vague-
ness and incoherence. But the nature of the EU as a unique, supranational entity means 
that such analysis risks falling into the trap of treating it as we would a nation State. 
Leaving aside the difficulties involved in forming a coherent vision of what kind of de-
mocracy should be promoted, it is possible to see that the fusion and interchangeability 
RIWKHODQJXDJHRIKXPDQULJKWVDQGWKHUHVSHFWIRUWKHUXOHRIODZZLWKLQWKH(8ȇVFRn-
cepWLRQRIGHPRFUDF\LVDUHIOHFWLRQRIWKH(8ȇVRZQOHJDORUGHU)XUWKHUPRUHWKHZD\V
in which the positive and negative measures are used are fundamentally legal in char-
acter, even if their deployment is often constrained by political considerations. 
The case study of Turkey demonstrates what the EU does towards a neighbouring 
country where the enlargement process is a significant but not the only frame for the 
relationship, in express, implied, positive and negative terms. As a neighbourhood and 
SRWHQWLDO(80HPEHU6WDWH7XUNH\ȇVVLWXDWLRQDQGUHODWLRQVKLSLVQRWIXOO\UHSOLFDWHGE\
any other State in the neighbourhood or be\RQG7KH(8ȇVHQJDJHPHQWZLWK7XUNH\FDQ
be exhibit features of democracy promotion across all four categories. The instances 
 
104 Commission, Turkey: 2015 Report, cit., pp. 67-68. 
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and weightings of positive/negative and express/implied democracy promotion are var-
LHG 7XUNH\ȇV HFRQRPLF VWUHQJWK DQG LPSRUWDQFH to the EU for tackling, in particular, 
challenges in migration exert a strong influence on the desire and ability of the EU to 
engage in the types of democracy promotion that might be found towards other States. 
And yet, the declining prospects of Turkish EU membership, increased fractiousness at 
the official government level and prioritisation of migration/security-focussed goals 
within the relationship exert strong effects on how democracy promotion is operation-
alized. Part of this is the role the EU plays in fulfilling the other goals of the Treaty, in-
cluding the security and well-being of its citizens, which has resulted in using measures 
ZKLFKVKRXOGDFFRUGLQJWRWKH(8ȇVRZQGLVFRXUVHEHWLHGPRUHFORVHO\WRGHPRFUDWLF
progress, such as visa liberalization. The pursuit of migration control and security has 
taken headline precedence over the promotion of democracy, and used as a catalyst to 
promise Turkey greater progress along the path of enlargement.  
However, what the analysis here has shown is that the multitude of ways and 
means that the EU has at its disposal to (attempt to) promote democracy in a third 
country offers an opportunity to understand the EU as a multifaceted international ac-
tor. Much democracy promotion is not subject to the potentially rapidly changing state 
of relations between the highest levels of government in Turkey and the EU institutions. 
The wider scope of analysis of democracy promotion demonstrates that this does not 
fatally undermine the characterisation of the EU as a normative power since the less 
visible, implied democracy promotion aspects remain, even when attention is focussed 
RQWKHȊKHDGOLQHȋLVVXHV 
7KH XQLTXHQHVV RI WKH (8ȇV UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK 7XUNH\ PHDQV WKDW WKH LQVWDQFHV RI
democracy promotion in all four of the categories are unlikely to be fully replicated in 
any other relationship. Herein lies the limitation to the case study used here. Neverthe-
OHVV LW LV LQVWUXFWLYH LQ WHUPV RI WKH (8ȇV RWKHU UHODWLRQVKLSV DQG SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH
around the neighbourhood in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. Since Turkey is 
the only country with an enlargement perspective, however distant, then if the EU is not 
successful in promoting values in the country then it would seem to undermine any 
chances to do so with other States. Rather, the danger is that the Turkish case shows 
the democracy promotion efforts to be hollow and easily waived, thus undermining the 
(8ȇVFUHGLELOLW\LQWKHUHJLRQDWKRPHDQGDVDJOREDODFWRU+RZHYHUWKHSDUWLFXODUQa-
ture of the EU as a non-State actor means that the aspects of democracy promotion 
which are less immediately visible, and particularly those which are implied rather than 
express, need to be taken seriously in evaluating what kind of an actor the EU is, and 
whether it meets its Treaty goals. 
